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The economic analysis of law enjoys a long and proud tradition in the United 
States (U.S.) and is firmly rooted in its legal system.  The growth of the “law and 
economics movement” in the American legal environment has been compared to the 
release of the rabbit in Australia. “[E]conomics found a vacant niche in the ‘intellectual 
ecology’ of the law and rapidly filled it.”1  Although initially confined to areas like 
antitrust and regulated industries, thanks to pioneering scholarship of academic 
luminaries such as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Guido Calabresi, the 
American law and economics movement has moved into almost every nook and cranny 
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2of the American legal landscape including criminal law, family law, employment 
discrimination, and procedural law.2
If the success of the application of economic analysis to legal problems in the 
U.S. can be compared to that of the rabbits released in Australia, the law and economics 
movement in Europe might best be compared to the experience of the camels that were 
released into the American southwest.3  Although the economic analysis of law has been 
of some interest to European scholars, it seems curiously out of place in their work and, 
so far, the discipline has not been successfully transplanted to the European academic 
eco-system.  Although European economists have shown a willingness to develop or 
apply economic analysis to law, the European legal system has remained largely immune 
to its benefits.4  Indeed, Professor Dau-Schmidt’s experience has been that the primary 
interest of European legal scholars in the economic analysis of law is for use as a window 
into the American legal mind, rather than for purposes of applying the same principles in 
the analysis of European laws.  The impact of the economic analysis of law on European 
legislation and court decisions has been negligible.5  Although it appears that the 
movement is currently under-appreciated in Europe, the authors believe there is 
tremendous opportunity for its future application on this continent. 
2
 Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 3, 4 (1997).
3 Cf. Robert Berg, Camels West, SAUDI ARAMCO WORLD, May-June 2002, available at
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200203/camels.west.htm.
4 See Lionel Montagné, Law and Economics in France, in 1 E NCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 150-
51 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0325book.pdf.  See also Éric Brousseau, Did the Common Law Bias the 
Economics of Contract…and May It Change?, in LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES (Bruno 
Deffains & Thierry Kirat, eds., 2001), available at
http://www.brousseau.info/en/publications/index.php?req=29 (last visited Sept. 17, 2004); Ugo Mattei & 
Robert Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A Comparative Approach, 11 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 265, 266 (1991).
5
 Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 277, 277 (1991).
3This essay will examine the reasons why the economic analysis of law has not 
flourished in European countries as it has in the U.S.  In particular, this paper will focus 
on three European countries—the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, and France.  Each 
of these countries has a different culture, legal system, and legal academy, which have 
led to different degrees of success in the application of economic principles in the 
analysis of law.  
II.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN THE U.S.
The economic analysis of law has played a significant role within the U.S. legal 
academy as well as in the development of the country’s legal system.  The U.S. legal 
academy has engaged in a dynamic interdisciplinary debate for decades; included most 
prominently in that discussion is the law and economics movement. 6   Scores of articles 
are written analyzing American legal doctrines and statutes from an economic 
perspective.7  Proponents of the economic analysis of law hold prestigious appointments 
to the federal bench, including Court of Appeals Judges Richard Posner and Frank 
Easterbrook and Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.8   Why has 
the economic analysis of law prospered in the U.S.?  An examination of the American 
culture, legal system, and legal academy yields many insights.
6 See Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, 17 
RATIO JURIS 66, 66 (2004).  See also Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) 
Additions to the Law School and Law and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 35-37 (2004); 
Robert S. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law 
and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 23, 29-30 (1989).
7 See Posner, supra note 6, at 66, n.1.
8 CENTO VELJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 26 (1990).
41. THE AMERICAN CULTURE AND LEGAL SYSTEM: THE PROTECTION OF RUGGED 
INDIVIDUALISM
Forged on the North American frontier, American culture is defined by the rugged 
individualism and autonomy of classic Lockean liberalism.  Liberalism holds that citizens 
are inevitably self-interested.9  Molding the citizenry towards a common good is a waste 
of time because one cannot remove self-interest, and in fact, diversity of interest 
precludes anything like a common good.  The goal of classic liberalism is to encourage 
citizens to pursue their own views and goals.10   Liberalism also holds that individuals are 
endowed with certain natural rights that are reserved by the individual in the social 
contract and not dependent on the government for their legitimacy.11  This is inconsistent 
with the French version of the social contract based on the work of Rousseau, which will 
be discussed shortly, in which all individual rights are given up to the state and then 
returned to the individual.  Moreover, since our experience as a British colony, 
Americans have been suspicious of big government and, therefore, strongly believe in 
limited government and decentralized decision-making.  
These characteristics of American culture are consistent with the economic 
analysis of law.  Neo-classical economic analysis is based on individual, rational 
decision-making, akin to the individual decision-making revered by classic liberalism.  
Moreover, the logic of neo-classical economic analysis supports decentralized decision-
making by market participants with minimal government interference as a means of 
maximizing efficiency.  This logic is consistent with the American distrust of government 
9 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, 
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 64, ¶ 124 (J.W. 
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1966) (1690).  “[Y]et men, being biased by their interest.” Id.
10 See id. at 63-66.
11 See id. at 43, ¶ 87.
5power and our Constitutional system of protecting individual rights from government 
intrusion.  Accordingly, it is not surprising that legal problems of interest to Americans 
are readily amenable to economic analysis.
Consistent with Lockean liberalism, individual rights in America are an integral 
part of the U.S. Constitution through the Bill of Rights.  The government is responsible 
for protecting individual rights and, in the event these rights are infringed, the courts must 
decide the limits and proper protection of these rights. As a result of Americans’ 
suspicion of big government, the U.S. Constitution created three separate and distinct 
branches of the federal government, each enjoying relatively equal distribution of power 
through a system of checks and balances.  This system was established to protect 
individual rights, and the states, from federal government encroachment.  The judiciary 
enjoys a relatively powerful role through judicial review established in Marbury v. 
Madison.12
  The relative strength and fluidity of the American judiciary seem to have 
provided significant impetus for the growth of the economic analysis of law in the 
American experience.13  Given their position of relative strength in our system of checks 
and balances, American judges are allowed, perhaps even compelled, to be more creative 
than their European counterparts.  Even in comparison with their British common law 
cousins, American judges are “considered far more adventurous.”14  Legislation to 
countermand a court decision, or remedy a problem, has to clear more hurdles under the 
12 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
13 See Posner, supra note 2, at 3-4.  
14
 Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic 
Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 295 (1996).  See also, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Independence 
in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 CHI. ROUND TABLE 205 (2000) (using a comparative empirical 
analysis to establish that American judges exercise greater discretion than their European siblings).
6U.S. legal system than under European parliamentarian systems.15  Moreover, in America 
it is “altogether natural for a lawyer in the course of his career to be a professor, a 
practicing attorney, a judge, and even a politician …this fluidity of roles has enabled a 
number of law professors identified with the movement to become consultants, 
practitioners, government officials, judges, and even Supreme Court justices.”16  Some of 
the movement’s best-known scholars, including Judges Richard Posner and Guido 
Calabresi, have been promoted to the bench.17
America’s common law system itself is also widely believed to have helped spur 
the law and economics movement.  It is presumed that a common law system is more 
efficient that a civil law system because “the common law [is] designed to give effect to 
private bargains with minimum active interference from the state…and common law 
rules tend to become precedential only to the extent that they are efficient…more 
efficient rules are upheld while less efficient ones are overruled.”18  Moreover, the role of 
the judge in the common law system is more extensive than that in a civil law system. 
Under a common law system, judges interpret statutes and the Constitution while 
“discovering” the common law that prevails in the absence of relevant legislation.  Under 
15
 Under the American system of checks and balances, laws must be approved by the House, Senate, and 
President to become law, and are subject to filibuster. Under the British parliamentary system, laws can be 
passed merely with the approval of one house of parliament.  The German parliamentary system has two 
houses and the French Presidential-Parliamentary system has two houses and holds the possibility of a split 
in party allegiance between the President and the Parliament, however, in practice both of these systems 
generally offer an easier time for the passage of corrective legislation than the American system of checks 
and balances.  Cooter and Ginsberg,  id. at 295-96.  
16
 Posner, supra note 2, at 3-4.  See also Posner, supra note 6, at 76-77.
17 VELJANOVSKI, supra note 8, at 26.
18
 Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1015 (1990).
7a civil law system the judge is merely the “mouth piece for the law” interpreting the legal 
rights and relationships that are established by the legislature in the code.19
2. THE AMERICAN LEGAL ACADEMY
The American legal academy combines student graduate study with a 
professionally trained professorate in a way that provides little cover for an entrenched 
philosophy of legal discipline.  In the U.S., students typically undertake study for a three-
year graduate legal degree (J.D.) after they have already successfully completed a four-
year undergraduate degree.  Traditionally, American law school professors had no 
education beyond the same three-year graduate degree conferred upon all attorneys and 
were drawn from legal practice.  This practice is changing, in no small part due to the 
success of the law and economics movement.20   However, at the time of the rise of the 
law and economics movement in the U.S. during the 1960’s and 70’s, the American 
academy combined a relatively well-educated student body that had been exposed to a 
variety of academic disciplines with a faculty with a relatively small investment in any 
particular academic perspective or school of thought.  This combination provided a fertile 
ground for the spread of economic analysis in the American academy in that it provided 
both students who had the undergraduate preparation for instruction in such theory and a 
professorate who were not overly wedded to existing legal philosophy.
19 See M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 170 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
George Bell & Sons 1906).
20
 The attainment of an additional graduate degree in law or even a Ph.D. in another discipline, is an 
increasingly important credential for young legal academics in America, while prior legal practice has 
declined in importance.  See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other 
Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 403, 414-15 (2004).
8Further undermining the entrenchment of the academic status quo in the U.S. is 
the fact that American legal scholarship is published in an exceedingly large number of 
primarily student-edited journals.   Because the vast majority of U.S. journals are student-
edited, legal scholars do not need to convince a fellow professor, steeped in the 
arguments of the prevailing legal discipline, that an article is important in order to get it 
published.  Only student editors need be convinced.  Articles in student-edited journals 
are published not because they fall into the traditional legal discipline but because they 
are interesting, novel, or controversial.  Accordingly, it is relatively easy for new and 
novel ideas from a variety of disciplines to find their way into the American legal 
literature.
Finally, just prior to the rise of the law and economics movement in the U.S., the 
American legal academy experienced a void in legal theory.  During the middle of the 
twentieth century, the logic of legal formalism gave way to the empirical demands of 
legal realism in the United States. 21   Rather than divining the inherent logic of the law 
from disparate appellate opinions, the American legal academy became increasingly 
concerned with documenting the reality of the law in practice.  At the same time, 
scholarship in philosophy undermined the traditional normative underpinnings of 
American legal thought.22   This decline in formalism and traditional normative theory 
created an opportunity for the rise of the economic analysis of law in the American legal 
21 See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV.
451, 453-54 (1974).  
“Once upon a time there was Formalism.  The law itself was a deductive system, with 
unquestionable premises leading to ineluctable conclusions.  It was, potentially at 
least, all consistent and pervasive…Then, out of the hills, came the Realists…they 
were much more interested in the way law actually functioned in society…The 
critical questions were henceforth no longer to be those of systematic consistency, but 
of existential reality.”  Id.
See also Ulen, supra note 20, 403. 
22
 Leff, supra note 21, at 454-55.
9academy.23  Not only was the structure of the American legal academy amenable to 
change, but the American legal academy needed to borrow from economics and other 
disciplines to fill the gaps in its own disciplinary perspective. Among all of the 
disciplines that the law has borrowed from, economics is the most important.  “The 
moving force of this change is not all of the ‘law and’ developments of the last twenty 
years but one particularly—law and economics.”24
3. WHY THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW HAS SUCCEEDED IN THE U.S.
The American cultural and legal landscapes have proven extremely fertile ground 
for the law and economics movement.  The neo-classical model of individual rational 
decision-making through decentralized markets strikes a harmonious cord with American 
individualism and our distrust of centralized government power.  Moreover, our system 
of governmental checks and balances and common law adjudication makes for a 
relatively strong and adventuresome judiciary that is more likely to be subject to 
evolutionary pressure towards efficient legal rules or to decide cases on the basis of 
public policy.  Finally, the history and structure of our legal academy allows for a wide-
open scholarly debate that incorporates facets from many disciplines.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the careers of the greatest theorists in the law and economics movement, 
23 See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 85 (1997). 
 “[O]ne of the reasons for the success of law and economics in America was the need 
for ‘reconstruction’ after years of realist jurisprudence had reduced legal scholarship 
to little more than a sterile commentary on case law.  Law and economics was seen as 
a tool for thinking about the law in broad theoretical terms, giving scholars back their 
role as social engineers.” 
Id. (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984); P.L. Chiassoni, Economic 
Analysis of Law, in Search of Constructive Realism, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: SOME FURTHER INSIGHTS
(R. Pardolesi & R. Van Den Bergh, eds., 1991)).
24
 Ulen, supra note 20, at 405.
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including Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, and Judge Posner, have been undertaken in the 
United States.
III.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN EUROPE
Although Europeans are curious about the law and economics movement, its 
impact on their legal environment has been comparatively slight, especially in the civil 
law countries.  Few European universities offer classes strictly devoted to the study of 
law and economics.25  Additionally, the study of law and economics is not generally 
incorporated into traditional law courses.26  Articles employing the economic analysis of 
law are relatively rare in the European academy and there is only one European journal 
dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law. 27  Economic analysis is fairly 
uncommon in European cases outside its traditional stronghold of antitrust, and there are 
no comparable judicial appointments of law and economics scholars to the bench as there 
has been in the U.S.  Of the three countries profiled in this paper, law and economics has 
been most successful in England and least successful in France.  An examination of the 
cultures, legal systems, and legal academies of these various countries, in comparison 
with our analysis of the U.S., will yield insight into this observation.
1. EUROPEAN CULTURE AND LEGAL SYSTEMS: CULTURED COLLECTIVISM 
a) The United Kingdom: A Proud Tradition of Collective Laissez-Faire 
25
 In Germany, for instance, only law schools in Hamburg, Munich, Oldenburg, and Hanover regularly 
offer courses in law and economics.  Thomas Henne, Environmental Policy in Germany and the United 
States, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 207, 226, n.84 (2003) (reviewing SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995)).  
26 See Kirchner, supra note 5, at 279-80.
27
 Posner, supra note 6, at 66. 
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The British have a strong class hierarchy.  Unlike in the U.S. where wealth and 
social stature can be attained through individual achievement, wealth and social stature in 
England are traditionally determined at birth.28  Class organization is strong among, but 
not between, the classes.  The organized working class has little trust in the upper class, 
which includes much of the British legislature and judiciary.29
The British are more invested in history and tradition than Americans, even 
though both countries follow the common law system.  Unlike the U.S., England has no 
written constitution.  The British constitution is not the outcome of a revolution as in 
France and the U.S.  Instead, it is an historical constitution to which only gradual, inch-
by-inch, changes are made over centuries.  The British have always looked to their 
inheritable past and time-honored traditions to determine the scope of their laws.30
Parliamentary sovereignty reigns in the U.K.  Parliament is comprised of a 
compound body made up of the Crown, the Lords, and the Commons.31  There is nothing 
above parliament.  Parliamentary sovereignty has facilitated a strong legislature at the 
expense of the executive and judiciary, and consequently, even though the British have a 
common law system, the judges have only a limited role in the interpretation of the law.
b) Germany: Human Rights in a Well-Ordered System of Co-Determination
28
 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan Under the Bargaining Model, 8 TULANE J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 117, 137 (2000) (citing HENRY BROWN, THE ORIGINS OF TRADE UNION POWER 208-09 (1983)).
29 Id.
30 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1987).  “The 
[Glorious] Revolution [of 1689] was made to preserve our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties and that 
ancient constitution of government which is our only security for law and liberty…All the reformations we 
have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reverence to antiquity.”  Id. at 27-28.
31 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 407 (9th ed. 1962) 
(1885).  See also Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#1.
12
Due to their experience in World War II, modern Germans place the utmost 
importance on human rights and collective cooperation.  German law values people as 
humans rather than commodities.  Moreover, the Germans have organized their society in 
a way that allows for the state mediation of interests among groups. For instance, 
Germany regulates its industrial relations system to encourage nation-wide collective 
bargaining between labor and management in and environment of cooperative 
consultation and exchanges of information.32  The net result is a more cooperative and 
productive system of industrial relations, with fewer work stoppages than in the U.S. and 
the U.K.33
While Germany does have a separation of powers doctrine, historic events have 
modified this doctrine to grant more power to the legislature, at the expense of the 
executive and the judiciary.  Although the German judiciary is independent, its discretion 
is generally limited to the interpretation of the civil code enacted by the legislature.34
“The German law courts tend to stay within the boundaries of traditional legal reasoning 
to keep their factual autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature.”35  Like the British, German 
judges avoid bringing external value judgments into the decision-making because of the 
ease in which the German legislature can overturn a judge-made legal rule.36
Not only does the threat of the loss of autonomy limit the role of German judges 
but the nature of a civil law system also narrows judicial discretion.  Under a common 
law system, the “judge is somehow expected to judge” whereas in civil law systems, the 
32
 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 28, at 146. 
33 Id.
34 See, Kirchner, supra note 5, at 283-84.
35 Id. at 285.
36 Id.
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code is expected “to have already judged.”37  Civil law “judges are not to be the 
cheerleaders for capitalism” but, instead, they should passively and mechanically enforce 
the law without regard to the wealth or social class of the parties.38  Values of fairness 
and equity tend to be more important under civil law systems than the efficiency that 
often influences U.S. common law decisions.39
c) France: “Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité!” dans une Société de Confrontation et de 
Conflit
The effect of the French Revolution was to overthrow the class-based system and 
to create national sovereignty.40  Unlike England, the French cultural and legal landscape 
is not predicated on class.  The French do not focus on individual self-interest but rather 
the common good of society.  “[L]aws are supposed to primarily organize relationship 
among people in order to avoid negative externalities and to ensure public order.”41
The French cultural and legal landscape has been shaped by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s theory of social contract.42  Under the social contract, all people form an 
37
 Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A Project in Progress, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 471, 471 (1997).
38
 Posner, supra note 6, at 76.  “[T]he national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the 
words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or its rigour.”  
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 19, at 170.
39
 Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
521, 539 (2004).   In contract disputes, French courts are less willing to allow the parties to renegotiate the 
terms of a contract and are more willing to grant specific performance over efficient breach because these 
doctrines will guarantee the fairness of the contract.  By contrast, American courts are more flexible and 
apply the doctrine that will provide the most efficient outcome.  See Brousseau, supra note 4, at 4.
40
 A nation “is a body of associates, living under a common law, and represented by the same legislature, 
etc.” Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 97 (Michael Sonenscher 
trans., 2003).
41
 Brousseau, supra note 4, at 5.
42 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Economy, in ON THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 15-103 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1983).
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association by giving to this community all of their individual rights.  None are reserved 
to the individual.  In return, the community provides order and gives back these rights to 
its citizens guaranteeing the rights in the social contract.  The community defends and 
protects the people and their goods. 43  The sovereign, in this case the nation, creates an 
ordering system to determine what is right for the common good of the community.44
Because law is an expression of the general will, it is not subject to judicial review.  It is 
the law that decides the division of rights and not the courts.
France, like Germany, is also a civil law system.  Common law was shunned
because it was “identified with the losing side” of the French Revolution.45  Judges were 
viewed with suspicion because they had upheld the class-based ancient régime by 
regularly overruling bourgeois reforms.  The revolutionaries “wanted to uproot 
‘medieval’ practices and replace them with ‘rational’ ones.  The revolutionaries 
proclaimed that law derived its authority from the popular will as expressed through 
legislators, not from social norms as found by judges.”46
2. THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY
In general European legal education combines undergraduate study for students 
with extensive academic preparation for the professorate.    In France and Germany, a 
law diploma is an undergraduate degree taught by highly professional scholars with 
graduate degrees beyond the regular law degree.  Although the traditional method of legal 
education in the U.K. is by reading for the bar, recently the British have adopted legal 
43 Id. at 23-25.
44 Id. at 25-26.
45
 Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating 
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1650 (1996).
46 Id. at 1650-51.
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education through formal undergraduate education at degree granting institutions.  
European law professors, on the other hand, undergo not only years of undergraduate 
study, but also years of practicum and graduate study, emerging from the end of a long 
process with degrees and training that would be the American equivalent of a Ph.D. in 
law.  As a result, in comparison with their American colleagues, European law professors 
teach students who have less preparation in other disciplines and European professors are 
more heavily invested in existing legal scholarship.
Institutional features of the European academy further entrench disciplinary 
practices and ideals.  Publication by European legal scholars is mostly in faculty-edited 
books or journals.  There are fewer European journals overall and only one European 
journal dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law.47 Very few of the general 
journals publish articles by law and economic scholars.48  Tenure, at least in France, is 
granted on a national, rather than an institutional, basis.  Review is undertaken through a 
unitary national process and review committee.  As a result, new approaches in the 
analysis of law must receive approval from scholars invested in the existing body of 
scholarship before they can be published or gain the author tenure.
Finally, formalism did not suffer the same precipitous decline in Europe that it did 
in the U.S.  The European conception of  “legal science” consists of a massive body of 
legal scholarship that can trace its roots all the way back to Roman law and which is 
considered such an important backdrop for the drafting of modern legal codes that all 
legal arguments generally start, and finish, with this body of accumulated wisdom.49
Although the legal realist movement made a strong challenge to formalism in Germany in 
47
 Posner, supra note 6, at 66. 
48
 Henne, supra note 25, at 226, n.84.
49
 Mathias Reiman, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science,  31 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV. 837(1990).
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the 1920’s and 30’s, the movement became associated with the Nazi regime and 
accordingly suffered a disadvantage in its consideration by modern European legal 
theorists. 50   European scholars of course recognize that strict formalism is not a 
completely accurate view of the development of law, but because this school of thought 
did not suffer the same precipitous decline it suffered in America, there has been no 
similar void in the discipline of law for the law and economics movement to fill.  
European legal academic institutions are less open to change because the law is already 
an established discipline and scholars are not necessarily looking to supplement it with 
other disciplines.   Accordingly, in Europe, the discipline of law has suffered less of a 
crisis of confidence, and there has been less need for legal theorists to borrow from other 
disciplines, including economics.  
3. WHY EUROPE HAS NOT BEEN FERTILE GROUND FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW
The relative lack of success of the economic analysis of law in Europe to date can 
be traced to characteristics of European culture, legal systems, and the European legal 
academy.  
In general European culture is more communitarian and steeped in history and 
tradition than American culture.  European society is more state-oriented and less trusting 
of the market.51  These aspects of European culture often make analysis of legal problems 
from the perspective of individual rational actors more curious from a European 
50 See R. Cooter & J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future, 11 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 261, 262 (1991) (citing Kirchner, supra note 5, at 284).
51
  John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public Law, 75 TULANE L. REV. 
1121, at 1130 (2001).
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perspective.  British culture organizes its society and law more around the traditional 
interaction of social groups than rational individual action.  For example, for years the 
British tolerated one of the most inefficient industrial relations systems in the 
industrialized world, based on work days lost to industrial strife, due to their acceptance 
of a tradition of class conflict through industrial strife.52  Similarly, the Germans’ 
commitment to human rights causes them to disdain express discussions of the value of 
human life and the efficient level of medical care or regulation.53  However, perhaps the 
French pose the best example of a communitarian society with their commitment to 
national sovereignty and the social contract as envisioned by Rousseau.  The French 
conception that the nation state adopts a system of ordering and law is inconsistent with 
the assumptions of the normative equality among all activities and the valuation of 
entitlements based on willingness to pay implicit in the simple neoclassical economic 
model.54  Moreover, the French do not focus on individual exchange and efficiency but 
rather on fairness and equity.  “The rationality of the economic agent who is perfectly 
aware of prices, and operates calculated choices in order to maximize his pleasure at the 
least cost, is a disconcerting model for one who searches solutions in equity and not in 
utility.”55
52
 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 28, at 139-40.
53
 This statement is based on Professor Dau-Schmidt’s seminar discussions with German students at the 
Institut für Internationales Recht, Christian-Albrechts-Universität on the value of human life and efficient 
safety regulation.
54
 For example, in his lectures at Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) concerning the Coase theorem, 
Professor Dau-Schmidt found that his French students were particularly skeptical of Coase’s claim of the 
reciprocity of harm. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-4 (1960).  
Similarly, Becker’s notion of the efficient level of crime based on an implicit valuing of the benefits of 
crime to the criminal makes no sense to the French. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
55
 Montagné, supra note 4, at 154.
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European legal systems also are less amenable to the economic analysis of law 
than the American system.  The European parliamentary systems allocate power more to 
the legislature, and less to the judiciary, than the American system.  Under British 
parliamentary sovereignty, the word of parliament is supreme.  Similarly, Germany’s 
separation of power doctrine allocates power to the legislature at the expense of the 
judiciary.  Although the German judiciary is independent, it is very careful not to “invoke 
external values or consideration of public policy” and risk losing its autonomy.56  As a 
result, the use of social sciences has met with great resistance when such arguments have 
been raised in legal interpretation.57   French judges also have a limited role in creating 
new law.  Like their German counterparts, French judges are ostensibly only to interpret 
the law because the law, as written by the nation, has already judged.58  Express policy-
based arguments, like those used in economic analysis, are generally not welcomed.  
The European civil law systems generally provide a more limited role for judges.  
“Civil law reasoning typically starts from abstract premises and concepts and, therefore, 
gives little room to the kind of consequentialist, forward-looking reasoning on which law 
and economics relies.”59  Although European scholars recognize that in reality even 
merely “reading” a statute can involve important policy decisions, the rhetoric of 
European legal practice in the civil systems is that all of the policy decisions have already 
been addressed by the legislature.60 Even though the British have a common law system 
56
 Kirchner, supra note 5, at 285-86. 
57 Id. at 284.
58
 de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, supra note 37, at 471.
59
 Spector, supra note 39, at 536.
60
 Dawson and Merryman believe that French judges are going beyond strict formalism in the decisions but 
are having to do it behind the scenes, “behind the veil of the formal French judicial decision:  French 
judges do approach cases with a certain pragmatic concern for realism, equity, and justice.  On the other 
hand, the dominant, rigid French conception of adjudication requires French judges mask their pragmatism, 
forcing them to operate under the table. This cuts French judges off from each other, preempting any 
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that is the precursor of our own, the role of the judges is more limited in the British 
system.  Because of parliamentary sovereignty, judges are less likely to be adventurous 
and stray too much from the time-honored traditions.61  They tend to rely more on the 
doctrine of stare decisis than even their American common law counterparts, which has 
the effect of leaving little room for policy analysis. 62
Moreover, the relationship of the judiciary to practitioners and academics in 
Europe, and the lack of fluidity among these three forms of practice, may also contribute 
to the slow growth of the law and economics movement in Europe.  The British legal 
profession “‘has been notoriously unwilling to admit the relevance of social science’” 
into the discipline.63  “The English legal fraternity is wary of theory, contemptuous of 
experts and academics, and reluctant to accept the idea that other disciplines have 
something valuable to say about ‘law.’”64  In Germany, the legal academy is under the 
influence of the judiciary.65  The judiciary’s cautionary relationship with social sciences 
has prevented economic analysis from becoming an integral part of the German legal 
academy.66  Lastly, a European legal scholar is unlikely to move from professor to 
practicing attorney to judge and to legislator.  In Germany and France, for instance, the 
judiciary is a separate profession.  “The isolation and the relative political impotence of 
European judiciaries have contributed to their formalist approach, in which law is 
reasoned and collective application of caselaw techniques.  The result is a combination of frustratingly 
formalist decision making and closeted, individual, ad hoc, unprincipled, and unconstrained judicial 
pragmatism.” Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 471, 474 (1997).
61
 Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 295.
62
 Spector, supra note 39, at 537.
63 VELJANOVSKI, supra note 8, at 11 (quoting A.J. Ogus & G. Richardson, Economics and the 
Environment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284 (1977)).
64 Id. at 12. 
65
 Kirchner, supra note 5, at 284.
66 See id. at 284.
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conceived of as a technical, autonomous discipline sealed off from other fields, such as 
economics.”67
Finally, the structure of the European legal academy has been less amenable to the 
growth of the law and economics movement in Europe.  The Europeans are heavily 
invested in law as an autonomous discipline and are quite happy with the academic 
product they produce.  Although there is certainly interest in inter-disciplinary research, 
the Europeans perceive no intellectual void or disciplinary crisis of confidence that they 
must fill with the economic analysis of law.  Moreover, the European systems of 
publication in faculty-edited journals and national tenure help to reinforce the entrenched 
academic establishment.  In order for new methods of analysis to make it into European 
scholarship, they have to gain at least some acceptance by academics that have built their 
careers on the status quo.
IV. THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPE
Although the economic analysis of law may never be as important to Europeans 
as it is to Americans, it undoubtedly has applicability to European legal problems and 
potential to grow in its importance.  No civil code is without its flaws.  Scholars have 
long known that “the official and perfectly formalist conception of passive adjudication 
on the basis of the unproblematic application of the Codes’ grammar is...no 
longer...tenable.”68  Civil law judges often have to fill these holes in the code with policy-
based rules, although this process is often hidden from public view.  Moreover, civil law 
systems are increasingly relying on case law as well as statutes and regulations outside of 
67
 Posner, supra note 2, at 5.
68 de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, supra note 37, at 488.
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the code to resolve disputes.69  Economic analysis can be a valuable tool in making such 
decisions.
If law and economics is to be successfully implemented in European countries, 
especially in those where the judiciary is not on equal footing with the legislature, then 
the economic analysis of law must permeate not only the legislature but also judicial 
interpretation.  Although it is true that even civil law judges inevitably make policy 
decisions in reading the code and deciding cases, within the European legal environment 
arguments that present express policy considerations are more appropriately made to the 
legislature.  If economic analysis of law is openly considered and applied by the 
legislature, then these arguments will become important to European judges and 
academics.  
The economic analysis of law may also become more important to Europeans as 
the European Union continues extend its regulatory coverage.   As European countries 
continue to work together within the Union, they will need a common language to unite 
their regulatory efforts and objectives.  Although the language of the law may differ 
among European countries, the language of economics is universal.70  Moreover, 
although its structures were crafted in light of the more state-centered political systems of 
Europe, the European Union was founded on the idea of liberalizing markets among the 
member states and has been supported by pro-market scholars.71  Given its foundations in 
market theory, it will be difficult for the European legal community to ignore the success 
of law and economics in analyzing the legal problems posed by the European Union.  
69
 Mattei & Pardolesi, supra note 4, at 268-69.  For example, a body of case law has been developed for 
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70
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The economic analysis of law may also enjoy more success in Europe as 
alternatives such as behavioral law and economics and socio-economics become more 
important in the law and economics movement.72  These alternatives to traditional 
neoclassical economic analysis consider limits to human rationality and group dynamics 
that may seem more realistic and appealing to European audiences.  In considering the 
legal questions posed by societies that are organized more around the interaction of 
classes and groups in society, Europeans may find the analysis of socio-economics more 
compelling.  Even Americans are now being drawn to these less traditional economic 
analyses in examining legal questions.73
While Europe currently lags significantly behind the U.S. in the economic 
analysis of law, it is possible for this gap to be quickly reduced.  The success of the 
European Union may create the opportunity for economic analysis to succeed first with 
the European legislatures and then with the judiciary and academy.  If the desire is there, 
the talented and highly skilled European academy can quickly assimilate this method of 
analysis.  Moreover, because European judges are generally recruited directly from law 
school, if the legal academy develops a program of study in which economic principles 
were consistently taught, these concepts will quickly enter the European judiciary. 74
Although the law and economics movement in Europe currently suffers a fate similar to 
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that of feral camels of the American Southwest, perhaps now that the camel’s nose is 
under the tent, we’ll soon see the more of this homely, yet useful, animal.
